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in prediction markets 
Erik Snowberg, Justin Wolfers and Eric Zitzewitz 
18.1 Introduction 
This chapter examines a new class of markets at the intersection of trad· 
itional betting and traditional financial markets. We call these 'prediction 
markets'. Like both financial and betting markets, prediction markets 
focus on uncertain outcomes and involve trading in risks. Prices from 
these markets establish forecasts about the probabilities, mean and median 
outcomes, and correlations among future events. These prices have been 
used to accurately predict vote shares in elections, the box office success of 
Hollywood movies and the probability that Saddam Hussein would be 
deposed by a certain date. Other names for these markets include 'virtual 
stock markets', 'event futures', and 'information markets'. 
Financial economists have long known about the information-aggregating 
properties of markets. Indeed, the efficient markets hypothesis, a centre· 
piece of financial theory, can be stated simply as, 'market prices incorpo· 
rate all available information'. While financial instruments can be very 
complex, prediction markets tend to be analytically simple. Their current 
simplicity, however, belies their powerful potential future as a way to 
hedge against geopolitical and other forms of risk as envisioned by 
Athanasoulis, Shiller and van Wincoop (1999) and Shiller (2003). 
Currently, most prediction markets are quite small, with turnover rang· 
ing from a few thousand dollars on the early political markets run by the 
University of Iowa, to several million bet in the 2004 election cycle on 
TradeSports, to hundreds of millions bet on the announcement of eco-
nomic indicators in Goldman Sachs and Deutsche Bank's 'Economic 
Derivatives' market. The most famous prediction market is the Iowa 
Electronic Market (IEM), which was started in 1988 to predict the vote 
share of the two major party presidential candidates. Since then, they have 
amassed a record of more accurate prediction than polls, all while limiting 
trading positions to a cap of $500. 
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The small size and relative newness of these markets can exacerbate the 
types of deviations from the efficiency seen in traditional financial mar· 
kets. A key focus of this chapter is understanding the conditions under 
which market prices are most likely to provide accurate predictions. Some 
of our diagnoses are well understood, and simply require increased liquid-
ity to rectify them, while others are more speculative, and should form the 
basis of further research. Better understanding of the sources and types of 
failures in prediction markets can only enhance their eventual usefulness. 
This chapter also emphasises more complex contracts that are in active 
use today. These contingent contracts, or 'decision markets', hold the 
promise not just of predicting uncertain events, but also of providing 
useful forecasts under alternative scenarios, which may inform decision 
making. 
We begin by briefly describing some simple types of contracts that are 
currently traded. We then examine the advantages and potential pitfalls of 
these markets. Finally, we survey the performance of existing markets, 
discuss contingent contracts, and conclude. 
18.2 Design of prediction markets 
Prediction market contracts are simply gambles on uncertain future 
events. Depending on the construction of the gamble, the price yields the 
market's expectation of different parameters. The simplest contract is one 
that pays a dollar if a certain event happens. The price of that contract at 
any given time is simply the market's belief about the percentage chance 
that the event will happen. 1 
Another common gamble is 'spread betting' where participants take an 
even money bet on a particular outcome. This sort of betting is often 
practised in American football and basketball: one bets that a favoured 
team will win by a point spread of at least y points. In a political context, 
this might be a bet that pays off if a candidate earns over y percent of the 
vote. In both cases, the market, or market-maker, must adjust y such that 
supply equals demand, which requires that half of the bets fall on either 
side. Thus, the spread reveals the market's expectation of the median 
of F(y). 2 
A final type of contract, which has proved less popular in sports betting 
is an 'index' bet. This contract pays off at the value of a particular par· 
ameter. For instance, sports bettors can buy a contract that pays off 
according to the number of runs a cricket team scores. This contract 
would thus reveal the market's expectation of the mean number of runs. 
This type of contract is most commonly used to predict a political candi-
date's share of the vote ··much as a poll might. 
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By using variants and/or bundles of these three types of contracts, it is 
possible to construct contracts that will reveal the market's expectation of 
higher-order moments and more complicated parameters of the distribu-
tion of outcomes. One such variant, the contingent contract, pays off only 
if two or more events happen simultaneously. We discuss this type in 
greater detail later. 
18.3 Applications and evidence 
Prediction markets, in their most basic form, have been around since at 
least the beginning of the 1900s.3 However, until recently, there were very 
few active markets. The proliferation of the Internet and its use for sports 
betting has enabled an explosion of prediction contracts. Indeed, most of 
the examples in this chapter are taken from contracts that have been set up 
in the last few years. There are still many questions that need to be 
rigorously examined as the data becomes available, but already we can 
draw a few generalisations. 
First, market prices tend to respond rapidly to new information. The 
following anecdote provides an interesting example. On 15 October 2003 
the Cubs faced the Marlins in game six of the National League 
Championship Series. The Cubs were favoured to win at the beginning 
of the game and soon built a comfortable 3-0 lead. In the top of the 8th a 
contract that paid $100 if the Cubs won was trading for over $95. Then 
Steve Bartman, a fan, reached over and spoiled Moises Alou's catch of a 
foul ball. The Marlins proceeded to score 8 runs in the remainder of the 
inning. By the end of the 8th, the contract on the Cubs winning was trading 
at around $5. Figure 18.1 shows the rapid incorporation of information 
into the contract price as the game progressed. 
Not only is information rapidly incorporated into prices, but additional 
information also contributes to the accuracy of the forecasts made by 
prediction markets. Figure 18.2 shows the accuracy of the predictions of 
the IEM vote share market as a function of the time before election day. It 
is clear that as election day approaches and more information is revealed 
and incorporated into market prices, the accuracy of the prices as predict-
ors increases. 
Second, very few arbitrage opportunities exist. They appear briefly and 
represent small profit opportunities. Figure 18.3 shows the bid and ask 
prices on a contract that paid $100 if Arnold Schwarzenegger was elected 
California's Governor in 2003, sampling data on bid and ask prices from 
two online exchanges every four hours. Both prices show substantial 
variation, but they move in lockstep. Arbitrage opportunities are virtually 
absent. 
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Figure 18.1 Rapid incorporation of information 
Source: www. tradesports.com. 
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Source: Prices collected electronically every four hours by David Pennock. 
A third characterisation is that these markets, when well capitalised, 
appear to be robust to certain forms of manipulation. There are several 
case studies that emphasise this point. Rhode and Strumpf (2004) report 
that there were largely unsuccessful attempts by the big party bosses at 
manipulating the betting on early twentieth-century political markets. 
Strumpf (2004) placed random $500 bets on the IEM and traced their 
effects, while Leigh and Wolfers (2002) provide examples of candidates 
betting on themselves in order to create a 'buzz'. Camerer ( 1998) placed 
and cancelled large bets in parimutuel horse-racing markets. While all of 
these attempts at manipulation met with failure (except for brief, transi-
tory effects) we obviously cannot draw any conclusions about the preva-
lence of the types of manipulation that have escaped the attention of 
analysts. 
Finally, in most cases these markets seem to satisfy at least the weak form 
of the efficient markets hypothesis. There appear to be no profit opportu-
nities from using simple strategies based on past prices. Leigh, Wolfers and 
Zitzewitz (2003) demonstrate this for the TradeSports 'Saddam Security', a 
contract that paid $1 if Saddam Hussein was ousted by a particular date. 
Rhode and Strumpf provide evidence for early twentieth-century political 
markets. Tetlock (2004) reports that in general the financial and political 
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contracts that trade on TradeSports are efficiently priced. We provide more 
evidence on the accuracy of these markets in section 18.5. 
18.4 When will prediction markets yield accurate predictions? 
There are three main facets to prediction markets. First, the market 
structure is essentially an algorithm for aggregating (and sharing) opin-
ions. Secondly, the financial and other incentives inherent in the market 
mechanism provide for truthful revelation. Finally, potential winnings 
provide robust incentives for information discovery. These features 
provide the power of prediction markets, and when one or more are 
missing the market's ability to predict will be undermined (Wolfers and 
Zitzewitz, 2004). We will address the problems in each category in turn. 
18.4.1 b?/'ormation aggregation 
As the old saying goes, in the short-run markets are a voting machine, and 
in the long-run a weighing machine. Much of the power of markets derives 
from the fact that they provide an algorithm for aggregating diverse 
opinions: weighting the votes of market participants according to their 
willingness to back them with money. 
However any algorithm will fail if it is deployed on an unclear task. 
Thus, contracts in prediction markets must be clear, easily understood and 
enforceable. A contract such as 'Howard Dean will win the presidential 
election' appears to satisfy the first two conditions, but could easily be 
challenged by a sore loser on the grounds that although Dean was clearly 
out of the running in the 2004 election, he may win in 2008. Adding a 
date,- i.e. 'Howard Dean will win the 2004 presidential election'- may not 
be enough as 'win' could refer to either the popular vote or the Electoral 
College. The requirement of clarity can be harder to satisfy than it appears 
at first glance. For instance, the day after the 1994 US Senate elections 
Senator Richard Shelby (Democrat Alabama) switched parties, throwing 
what seemed like a well-written contract on how many seats each party 
would take into confusion. Sometimes there is a trade-off between con-
tractibility and capturing the event of interest. In 2003, TradeSports ran 
markets in 'Will there be a UN Resolution on Iraq (beyond #1441)?' and 
'Will Saddam be out of office by June 30?' The former is clearly more 
contractible, but the latter is what traders wanted to bet on. 
The key information aggregator is the market mechanism, and most 
prediction markets are run as a continuous double auction. Buyers and 
sellers submit bids and asking prices, respectively, and trade occurs when 
they reach a mutually agreeable price. Other markets, such as those used to 
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predict announcements of economic statistics, are run according to a 
parimutuel system. There is not enough data at this point to determine 
which market designs work best in which situations, particularly when 
markets are thin. 
Since prediction markets have designs similar to many gambling mar-
kets, we can learn a lot about potential problems from studies of gambling. 
The longest-standing stylised fact regarding horse-race betting is the 
favourite-longshot bias, which is depicted in figure 18.4. Close examin-
ation of this phenomenon suggests that the behaviour it embodies is of 
concern in prediction markets, a point emphasised by Manski (2004). 
On average, gamblers lose about 18 cents of every dollar wagered, 
and this ratio approximately holds for most horses- those with a 5 per cent 
to 50 percent chance of winning. At the extremes, however, there are 
substantial deviations. Wagers on longshots produce much lower returns, 
offset by somewhat higher (albeit still negative) returns for betting 
on favourites. The overbetting of longshots ties in with a range of 
experimental evidence suggesting that people tend to overvalue small 
Favourite-longshot bias: rate of return at different odds 
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Figure 18.4 Miscalibration of small probabilities 
Note: Sample is all horse races in the US, 1992-2002. n = 5,067,832 starts in 
611,807 races. 
Source: Trackmaster, Inc. 
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probabilities and undervalue near-certainties. We see that these errors 
persist beyond the psychology lab in equilibrium even in large and extre-
mely active markets (Snowberg and Wolfers, 2004). 
A related phenomenon is the 'volatility smile' found in options. This refers 
to overpricing of strongly out-of-the-money options, and underpricing 
of strongly in-the-money options relative to Black-Scholes benchmarks; 
thus the 'smile' refers to the shape of the relationship between implied 
volatility and strike price. Ait-Sahalia, Wang and Yared (2001) argue that 
the conclusion of miscalibration is less clear-cut in this context, because these 
prices may be driven by small likelihoods of extreme price changes. 
Additionally, when dealing with the pricing of options, one must take into 
account non-probabilistic factors such as wealth-dependent risk aversion, 
margin requirements and time to maturity. The effects of these constraints 
are more likely to be felt in small, poorly capitalised and long-horizon 
markets, so one should be especially careful when interpreting prices in 
such markets. 
The miscalibration that causes the favourite-longshot bias and the 
'volatility smile' appears in the pricing of certain securities related to 
financial variables on TradeSports. Table 18.1 reports the price of 
securities that paid off if the S&P finished 2003 in certain ranges. These 
securities can be approximated using December Chicago Mercantile 
Exchange (CME) S&P options. Comparing TradeSports prices with the 
state prices implied by CME option prices suggests that deep-out-of-the-
money options are relatively overpriced on TradeSports. In the case of the 
most bearish securities, the price differences created a (small) arbitrage 
opportunity, one which persisted for most ofthe summer of2003. Similar 
patterns existed for TradeSports' state securities on other financial vari-
ables (e.g. crude oil and gold prices, exchange rates, other indices). This is 
consistent with the favourite-longshot bias being more pronounced on 
smaller-scale exchanges. 
While these behavioural biases may affect pricing in prediction markets, 
to the extent that they are systematic it remains possible to de-bias market 
prices so as to yield efficient forecasts. 
18.4.2 Truthfulrevelation 
Prediction markets must provide incentives for truthful revelation of 
information. However, these incentives do not necessarily need to be 
monetary. Indeed, the thrill of placing bets and the bragging rights of 
correct predictions may be enough to motivate traders. Some sites, such 
as NewsFutures.com use play money, where those who amass the largest 
play fortunes may be eligible for prizes. There is not enough evidence to 
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Table 18.1. Price of" S&P state securities" on TradeSports l'ersus CM E 
market close, 23 July 2003 
S&P level at end of 2003 
1200 and over 
1100 to 1199 
1000 to 1099 
900 to 999 
800 to 899 
700 to 799 
600 to 699 
Under 600 
S&P level on 23 July 2003 
Note: 
Bid 
2 
11 
28 
25 
14 
3 
4 
5 
Price on TradeSports 
Estimated state priceb 
Ask from CME S&P options 
6 2.5 
16 13.2 
33 33.3 
30 30.5 
19 13 
8 5 
7 2 
8 l 
985 
"Prices given arc the price of a security that pays $100 if S&P finishes 2003 in given 
range 
h Stale prices are estimated from CME option settlement prices using the method 
in Leigh, Wolters and Zitzewitz (2003), adjusting for the thirteen-day difference in 
expiry date. 
ascertain whether the use of real money makes an economically signifi-
cant difference, although Servan-Schreiber, Wolfers, Pennock and 
Galebach (2004) provide suggestive evidence that play-money markets 
predicted NFL results as well as real-money markets. Since the only way 
to amass play-money is through a history of accurate prediction, it may 
even be that play-money outperform real-money exchanges. Since real-
and play-money exchanges are not arbitrage linked there exist differences 
in the prices on the different types of exchanges. For example, in August 
2003, Bush was a 2 to I favourite to win re-election on real-money 
exchanges, but was even-money on NewsFutures. By exploiting these 
differences in sufficiently large samples, it should eventually be possible 
to determine the factors driving the relative accuracy of real- and play-
money exchanges. 
Trading in prediction markets is much less attractive when the person you 
are betting against has control over the event in question, or if a relatively 
small group possesses most information on an event. Indeed, attempts to set 
up markets on topics where there are insiders with substantial information 
advantages have typically failed. For instance, market-makers withdrew 
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liquidity from markets on the winner of the pre-recorded reality show 
Survivor after CBS employees were accused of insider trading. Perhaps 
for the same reason, the TradeSports contracts on the next Supreme Court 
retirement have generated very little trade, despite the inherent interest in 
the question. 
Finally, there is some evidence that the smaller-scale prediction markets 
are slower to incorporate information than deeper related financial mar-
kets. For example, Leigh, Wolfers and Zitzewitz (2003) found that changes 
in the 'Saddam Security' lagged war-related changes in the S&P or oil 
prices by 1-2 days. This is to be expected given that deeper financial 
markets have more traders investing larger sums of money, so there is 
more attention to buying and selling quickly when news breaks. 
18.4.3 Information discovery and sharing 
The incentives provided by a prediction market must be large enough to 
motivate the collection and sharing of information through the market 
mechanism. It is important to note here that although the vast amount of 
money in prediction markets may be uninformed, it is the marginal, not 
average dollar that sets prices. Thus, the presence of a few informed traders 
can still lead to very accurate predictions. It is because of this distinction 
between the average and marginal dollar driving prices that one cannot 
simply earn a profit betting against the New York Yankees (although one 
may derive some pleasure from doing so). 
Figure 18.5 shows the price of a contract on whether or not weapons of 
mass destruction (WMD) will be found in Iraq. Note that at some points 
the value of the contract exceeded SOper cent, yet weapons were never 
found. It is likely that this market performed poorly since the cost of 
gaining new information was quite high. Since WMD can be non-existent 
almost everywhere, but still exist somewhere, it was difficult to bet against 
the strong case made by the White House, at least initially. 
Even if the market designer can avoid the above pitfalls a market will fail 
unless there is a motivation for trade. Trade in these markets can be 
motivated by a desire to hedge against risk, the thrill of pitting one's 
judgement against others, or a perceived profit opportunity on both 
sides because of divergent opinions over outcomes. 
None ofthe prediction markets run on the websites we surveyed arc large 
enough to truly hedge against significant risk. George W. Bush could not 
take a large enough stake against himself in order to ensure a win-win in the 
upcoming election. By providing contracts that are better linked to the 
underlying source of risk in individual portfolios, it seems likely that pre-
diction markets will become more liquid, yielding more accurate pricing. 
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Will WMD be discovered in Iraq? 
------------ By end May 2003 
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Figure 18.5lnefficiencies in prediction markets 
Source: Average daily price data provided by www.tradesports.com. 
That said, as risk aversion becomes an increasingly important driver of 
trade, it may become necessary for researchers to adjust market prices for 
the risk premium, rather than interpreting them directly as probabilities. 
These factors suggest that prediction markets are most likely to succeed 
when events are widely discussed with diverse interpretations of the avail-
able public information. The general interest creates both a larger pool of 
potential traders, as well as a greater thrill of being right. The public nature 
of the information makes it unlikely that there will be a perception of 
manipulation or corruption. 
18.5 Performance of prediction markets 
As troubling as some of the theoretical and practical problems with pre-
diction markets may be, they generally- but not always··- perform welL 
The evidence on this comes from a range of fields as diverse as the 
imaginations of the experimenters who use them. In the political domain, 
Berg, Forsythe, Nelson and Rietz (2001) summarise the evidence from the 
IEM, documenting that the market has both yielded very accurate predic-
tions and also outperformed large-scale polling organisations. Figure 18.6 
shows the aggregate forecast performance of all these experimental mar-
kets (or at least those for which data is publicly available). Each point 
represents the proportion of contracts trading at a given price that won. If 
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Iowa Electronic Markets Predicting election winners 
Average across across all Winner-take-all markets 
0.2 0.4 0.6 0.8 
Market price (=Forecast probability of winning) 
Figure 18.6 Accuracy of predictions 
Note: 
• 
n=23,941 daily price observations in lOO split-adjusted winner-take-all contracts 
over twenty-five elections. 
Source: Author's calculations based on data available at: www.biz.uiowa.edujiemf. 
markets were perfectly accurate, then we would expect the data to lie along 
the 45 degree line. Not only are these markets typically quite accurate, but 
previous research has documented that they are better predictors than the 
Gallup poll. 
In spite of the concerns we raise above about the amount of interest and 
liquidity necessary for a functioning prediction market, there are examples 
of smaller markets that work well. At the level of individual political 
districts there is often little interest in, or money for, local polling. Yet 
when Australian bookmakers started opening contracts on district-level 
races, W olfers and Leigh (2002) show that they were extremely accurate. 
Politicians and pundits use more than just polls when evaluating election 
chances and policy choices. They also rely on expert opinion. Figure 18.7 
shows that the 'Saddam Security' co-moved tightly with both expert 
opinion (Will Saletan's 'Saddameter' -his estimate of the probability of 
the US going to war with Iraq) and oil prices (which respond to turmoil in 
the Middle East). 
In a business context, Chen and Plott (2002) report that a well-designed 
internal market produced more accurate forecasts of printer sales than the 
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Risk of war in Iraq 
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Source: Trade-by-trade Saddam security data provided by Tradesports.corn; 
Saddameter from Will Saletan's daily column in State.corn. 
firm's standard processes. Project planning has also been subjected to the 
judgement of prediction markets. Ortner ( 1998) launched an experimental 
market that predicted that a firm would definitely not meet its delivery 
target even when traditional planning tools suggested that it may have 
been on track. The market prediction proved correct. In the world of 
entertainment, Pennock, Lawrence, Giles and Nielsen (200 I) show that 
the Hollywood Stock Exchange can usefully predict box office takes of 
films on their opening weekend and is about as accurate in picking Oscar 
winners as a panel of experts. 
New markets in 'economic derivatives' also provide a useful contrast 
with expert opinion. Typically, in the run-up to the release of economic 
numbers such as inflation surveys, non-farm payrolls, retail trade and the 
Institute for Supply Management (ISM) purchasing managers' index, 
experts offer their opinions about what the numbers will be. These 
numbers are aggregated into a 'consensus forecast' and the market's 
reaction to the release of the economic numbers is often tied to whether, 
and by how much, the actual number differs from the consensus forecast. 
In table 18.2, we compare the performance of the consensus estimate with 
the results of the economic derivatives auctions, from their first year of 
operation. 
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Table 18.2. Predicting economic outcomes comparing market-aggregated 
forecasts with consensus surveys, mean absolute error ojforecasts 
Non-farm Retail trade ISM 
payrolls (ex-autos) manufacturing 
(monthly (monthly purchasing 
change, 000) change,%) managers' index 
Consensus estimate 71.1 0.45 1.10 
Economic derivatives 72.2 0.46 1.07 
Prediction market 
sample size 16 12 II 
The consensus and market-based estimates of these economic indicators 
are extremely close- so close that there is no statistically (or economically) 
meaningful difference in forecast performance. This is true if one examines 
either correlations with actual outcomes or average forecast errors. That 
is, in this case the consensus estimate appears to aggregate expert opinion 
about as well as the prediction market. Even so, this early sample IS 
sufficiently small that precise conclusions are difficult to draw. 
18.6 Using prediction markets in decision making 
We know we can use prediction markets to make accurate assessments 
about uncertain future events. We now turn to how to use these predictions 
to better inform decision making. 
The simplest approach is to just use the predictions directly. For 
instance, in their experiments at Hewlett Packard, Chen and Plott (2002) 
elicited expectations of future printer sales through a market in which 
employees bet against each other. These expectations are likely of direct 
interest for internal planning purposes. 
Researchers have also tried to link the time series progression of predic-
tion markets with other variables in order to find the correlation between 
the two. For instance, prior to the 2004 election, several analysts tried to 
find a link between the probability of George W. Bush's re-election and the 
price of the S&P 500. The result is a strong positive correlation between an 
increase in Bush's chance of re-election and the health of the stock market. 
While this has been trumpeted as evidence that Bush would be better for 
the economy than Kerry, this provides a very clear case where correlation 
does not imply causation. It is just as likely that a strong economy would 
increase the chances of Bush's re·election as the other way around. 
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Two further elements are required for a regression analysis to be feasi-
ble: (1) time series variation in event probabilities, and (2) a sufficiently 
strong correlation to allow one to distinguish the relationship from other 
events affecting the probabilities. By using a slightly different set of con-
tracts, however, it is possible to estimate correlations even when these 
conditions are not satisfied. For example, we could sell two securities, 
one which pays $P a year from now if Bush is re-elected (where $Pis the 
price of the S&P 500 a year from now) and the purchase price is refunded if 
Kerry is elected, and a second that pays $P if Kerry is elected, with the 
purchase price is refunded if he is not. The difference would be the market's 
expectation of the relationship between the election of Bush or Kerry and 
the S&P 500. Of course, while these securities form a contingent market-
one that allows us to gauge the market's expectation of one event con-
tingent on another event occurring - they do not resolve the issue of 
whether this correlation reflects a causal relationship. 
Very few contingent markets have been constructed, but they are grow-
ing in popularity. In 2004 the IEM offered securities linked both to the 
two-party vote share of each Democratic candidate and the vote share of 
Bush if he were to face that particular candidate. These contracts pay 
nothing if that particular match-up does not occur. These securities can 
be used to infer the probability that a given Democrat wins the primary, as 
well as the expected two-party vote share if sfhe were to win the nomina-
tion. The prices and calculations from two days before the Iowa Caucus 
appear in table 18.3. 
Column (A) shows the price of a contract that pays the Democratic vote 
share in the general election; the bettor must also pick the Democratic 
nominee, or the security pays nothing. Column (B) shows the price of a 
contract that pays Bush's vote share, if the bettor also correctly picks the 
Democratic nominee and nothing otherwise. The prices thus reflect the 
market's assessment of both the chance of the candidate winning 
the Democratic nomination and the share of the vote he would take 
against Bush. 
No matter who the candidate is, the expected Democratic and Republican 
shares of the two-party vote must sum to one. Thus, adding the prices of the 
securities shown in columns (A) and (B) yields the probability that each 
candidate wins the Democratic nomination (shown in column (C)). 
A more interesting statistic would be the market's expectation of how 
each candidate would fare versus Bush if they win the nomination. As 
suggested by Robin Hanson (1999), this number could then be used to 
inform the nomination decision of the Democrats, as they presumably 
would like to nominate someone with a good chance of winning the general 
election. The calculation is done in column (D). This logic suggests that 
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Table 18.3. Contingent markets 
Bush vote-share Prob. this Expected 
Candidate given this candidate vote-share 
vote-share candidate wins nomination if nominated 
(A) (B) (C)= (A)+(B) (D)= ( A)j(C) 
Candidate ($) ($) (%) (%) 
Howard Dean 0.289 0.245 53.4 45.9 
Wesley Clark 0.101 0.102 20.3 50.2 
Richard 
Gephardt 0.017 0.019 3.6 52.8 
John Kerry 0.062 0.067 12.9 51.9 
Other 0.042 0.049 9.1 53.8 
Democrats a 
Note: 
a By this date, 'Other Democrats' was more or less the same as John Edwards. 
Edwards did not have a security tied to him until four days after the lowa caucuses. 
Source: Closing prices, 17 January 2004, IEM. 
they should choose Edwards or Kerry as the nominees (Gephardt was 
already largely out of the running). This implication has led these con-
tingent contracts to sometimes be called 'decision markets'. 
We are optimistic that contingent contracts can be used to inform 
decision making; however, some care must be taken when doing so. 
There are many plausible stories one could come up with for the reason 
why the Kerry security is trading higher than Bush I Kerry. For instance, 
the markets may believe that Kerry won't win the nomination unless the 
country makes a dramatic shift to the left, but that if this does happen it 
is likely that Kerry will win both the nomination and the election. 
Simply nominating Kerry based on these contingent contracts would 
then be a mistake, since it will not make the country swing to the left, and 
Kerry would thus be more likely to lose the general election than, say, 
Edwards. 
Irrespective of such issues, the predictions based on these contingent 
contracts seem to be consistent with subsequent events. On 19 January 
2004, Howard Dean lost the Iowa Caucus in spectacular fashion, and that 
evening self-destructed as he uttered the now infamous 'Dean Scream'. His 
likelihood of winning the Democratic nomination tumbled from 53.4 per cent 
to 24.5 per cent by the end of that night. John Kerry, who won that day, 
saw his probability rise from 12.9 per cent to 25.8 per cent while John 
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Edwards, who came second, saw his rise from 9. I per cent to 22 per cent. 
These candidates were predicted to fare much better against Bush, 
and accordingly, Bush's expected share of the two-party vote fell~ from 
52.1 per cent the night before the Iowa caucuses to 48.5 per cent the night 
after. (In an analogous example, Berg and Rietz, 2003, found that as it 
became clear in 1996 that Bob Dole would win the Republican primary, 
Bill Clinton's re-election chances soared.) 
We also have preliminary results from an experimental contingent 
contract we ran on TradeSports. This experimental security paid $1 if 
both Bush were re-elected and Osama bin Laden were captured by the 
election. It seems likely that bin Laden's capture would have a positive 
effect on Bush's re-election chances, and the markets agree. In mid-June a 
contract on Bush's re-election was trading at $57 and an implicit contract 
on bin Laden being captured by 2 November was trading at around $27. 
The joint contract requiring both events to occur was trading for 
approximately $21. Using the prices and method above, this tells us 
that the market assessed the probability of Bush winning if bin Laden 
were captured at 77 per cent. It also tells us that the market thought that 
the chance of Bush being re-elected if bin Laden were not captured was 
50 per cent. 4 
A cleaner example of the difficulty of untangling correlation and caus-
ality comes from a second contract we ran on TradeSports. This contract 
paid $I if Bush won the 2004 election and the terror alert on election day 
was at its peak level of 'red'. The market put the probability of this 
occurring at 8.0 per cent, and the probability of red alert on 1 November 
(the day before the election) at 8.2 per cent. Using these two numbers, we 
infer that the market believes if the terror alert level is at 'red' then Bush 
has a 97 per cent chance of winning the election. This estimate seems rather 
high. There is probably some imprecision due to the problem of miscali-
bration of small-probability events and the small amount of trading in this 
market. 
If we take this estimate at face value, however, we are confronted with 
another problem. One explanation might be that the increased threat of 
terrorism would cause Americans to rally around Bush and re-elect him. 
However, recall that in Spain in early 2004 a terrorist attack caused the 
incumbent party to lose the election. If terrorists think a similar thing 
might happen in the US, we might be tempted to infer that the market 
believes that if Bush looks strong in the election, this may increase the 
threat of a terror attack, raising the alert level. 
If we were to pass an econometrician data on the likelihood of Bush 
winning the election and the terror alert level in many states of the world, 
the econometrician would note a strong correlation between Bush winning 
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and an elevated terror alert level. However, she would not declare a causal 
relationship between the two. Instead, she would note that there are 
'selection effects' - that is, the states of the world in which the country is 
on red alert are not random. 
Just as an econometrician uses a selection model to correct for selec-
tion bias (Heckman, 1979) one can simply add another security or con-
tingency tied to a variable that is driving the terror alert level (such as 
reports of terrorist activity overseas). If the probability of a certain 
contingency is high, then only stories that include it are plausible expla-
nations of what will cause a 'red' alert. However, this eliminates scenarios 
only in a piecemeal fashion, and to the extent that there are an infinite 
number of possible scenarios involving an infinite number of variables, 
not all of which are observable, it will never be possible to absolutely pin 
down causation. 
The preceding paragraphs may make it sound as if there are extreme 
difficulties with prediction markets that make their use in this domain 
hopeless. However, the difficulties here are no different than those in any 
other econometric situation. These issues should be the topic of further 
research and application. In the meantime, simple prediction markets 
continue to be extremely useful for estimating the market's expectation 
of moments or distributions- even multivariate ones. 
18.7 Looking forward 
This chapter has focused jointly on the promise and the limitations of 
prediction markets. While these markets manifest the pathologies of all 
financial markets more deeply, it is important to keep in mind that they 
also outperform many other prediction tools, often at lower cost. One's 
optimism about the further use of prediction markets in business, govern-
ment and finance depends a lot on what sorts of mechanisms for prediction 
one is comparing the market-generated prices with. 
Furthermore, there is a broad pool of research into more common 
financial markets that has not yet been applied to these markets. 
Currently the level of sophistication of prediction markets in practice is 
such that they can be understood using very basic financial tools and rules 
of thumb. As these markets prove themselves and become better capital-
ised there will be an incentive to apply more advanced methodologies to 
their execution. This in turn will lead to more effective and efficient 
markets that will embody fewer of the problems we have outlined and 
allow for true hedging against geopolitical and other risks. 
We have also focused on an emerging, more complex form of markets 
that try to predict the probability of multiple events happening 
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simultaneously. These contingent contracts, or 'decision markets', can be 
used in conjunction with simpler securities to tease out the market's 
perception of factors important to public decisions. As we note, there are 
difficulties in separating correlation from causality but, carefully applied, 
we believe that there are domains in which these markets will be useful 
public policy inputs. 
Prediction markets are, at their core, a tool for deriving consensus 
estimates and assessments from a diverse body of people and opinions. 
To the extent that there exist questions that are important enough to 
generate interest, and thus liquidity, prediction markets may be used to 
replace or augment more primitive technologies such as frequent meetings 
or arbitrary algorithms. 
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The price of a winner-take-all security is essentially a state price, which will 
equal an estimate of the event's probability under the assumption of risk-
neutrality. The sums wagered in prediction markets are typically small enough 
that assuming that investors are not averse to the idiosyncratic risk involved 
seems reasonable. But if the event in question is correlated with investors' 
marginal utility of wealth, then probabilities and state prices can differ. 
In what follows, we leave this issue aside and use the term 'probability' to 
refer to risk-neutral probability. For more on this topic, see Wolfers and 
Zitzewitz (2005). 
2 There is a subtle, an almost metaphysical question here: What is the 'market's' 
expectation anyway? Throughout, we will speak as though the market is itself 
a representative person, and that 'person' has a set of expectations. Consequently 
there are important but subtle differences between parameters such as the market's 
median expectation and the median expectation of market participants. 
3 Rhode and Strumpf (2004) investigate turn-of-the-twentieth-century markets 
that were used to predict the outcomes of presidential elections. If you see sports 
gambling as a rudimentary form of prediction markets, then obviously predic-
tion markets are quite a bit older. 
4 This last figure can be calculated by Bayes' Rule: (57-21)/(1 00-27) ~ 50 
per cent. 
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